No Longer the Right to Remain Silent: Cross-examining Forensic Analyst Testimony by Unwin, Casey
BYU Law Review
Volume 2010 | Issue 3 Article 16
3-1-2010
No Longer the Right to Remain Silent: Cross-
examining Forensic Analyst Testimony
Casey Unwin
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Casey Unwin, No Longer the Right to Remain Silent: Cross-examining Forensic Analyst Testimony, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1025 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss3/16
DO NOT DELETE 11/12/2010 5:49:10 PM 
 
1025 
No Longer the Right to Remain Silent:                     
Cross-examining Forensic Analyst Testimony 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Forensic evidence helps solve crimes and is a fascination among 
the general public. Popular television programs such as CSI and 
NCIS expose the public to many of these investigative tools and give 
them a “mythic infallibility” in the eyes of juries.1 Many refer to this 
as the “CSI effect.”2 Forensic evidence can identify a suspect or even 
vindicate an accused. The Innocence Project, for example, has used 
DNA evidence to exonerate wrongfully convicted defendants and 
save them from death row convictions and life sentences.3 Sadly, 
some of these convictions originally occurred as a result of other, 
faulty forensic evidence.4  
A two-pronged approach helps combat faulty forensic evidence. 
First, accused persons have the right to confront testimony against 
them by questioning the laboratory technicians who perform the 
 
 1. Brad Reagan, CSI Myths: The Shaky Science Behind Forensics, POPULAR MECHANICS, 
Aug. 2009, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/4325774.html? 
page=2. 
 2. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, The CSI Effect: How TV Is Driving Jury Verdicts All Across 
America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 25, 2005, at 48. The CSI effect can be summed up 
as basically leading jurors to expect forensic evidence in every case and assuming it to be 
conclusive and accurate. See also N.J. Schweitzer & M.J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction 
About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 
JURIMETRICS J. 357 (2007); Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its Effects: Media, 
Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 435 (2007). 
 3. See generally The Innocence Project Profiles, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
 4. Compare The Innocence Project Fact Sheet: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA 
Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Sept. 29, 
2010) (“Unvalidated or improper forensic science played a role in approximately 50 percent of 
wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA testing.”), and Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008) (examining the results of an empirical study on the 
type of faulty evidence that led to wrongful convictions in over two hundred cases), with John 
Collins & Jay Jarvis, The Wrongful Conviction of Forensic Science, CRIME LAB. REP., July 16, 
2008, available at http://www.crimelabreport.com/library/pdf/wrongful_conviction.pdf 
(contending that forensic science malpractice only accounted for 11 percent of wrongful 
convictions in their survey), and Norah Rudin & Keith Inman, Who Speaks for Forensic 
Science?: The Conviction and Exoneration of a Straw Man, CACNEWS: NEWS OF THE CAL. 
ASS’N OF CRIMINALISTS, 4th Q. 2008, at 10, available at 
http://www.cacnews.org/news/4thq08.pdf. 
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research. Second, the forensic scientist community has engaged in 
increased efforts to address problems facing the field of forensic 
research and practice. The Supreme Court helped further these 
efforts with its holding in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,5 and in 
doing so, it also sent a message to the forensic community that 
technology must continue to improve to justify the use of forensic 
evidence. 
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court correctly extended the 
Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence and held that an accused 
must have an opportunity to cross-examine forensic analysts because 
this evidence is testimonial in nature.6 This Note begins in Part II by 
discussing prior cases and developments related to the Confrontation 
Clause that led to the Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz. Part III 
examines the facts, procedural history, and holding in Melendez-
Diaz. Part IV then analyzes the reasoning the Court relied upon to 
extend the Confrontation Clause to provide defendants with an 
opportunity to cross-examine laboratory technicians. Part V 
examines recent critiques of forensic evidence and explains why the 
Court was correct in requiring laboratory technicians to testify 
regarding forensic science. Part VI provides a conclusion. 
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
The Confrontation Clause requires that the accused have the 
opportunity to cross-examine testimonial statements made against 
him in court.7 The decision in Melendez-Diaz was the result of 
several cases gradually expanding the type of evidence that qualifies 
as “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes. Ohio v. Roberts,8 
for instance, set forth the standard for interpreting the 
Confrontation Clause—a standard that was extended in Crawford v. 
Washington.9 The Court then further defined what qualified as 
testimony and required cross-examination in Davis v. Washington.10 
With Melendez-Diaz, the Court continued the gradual expansion of 
the types of testimony that fall under the Confrontation Clause. 
 
 5. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009). 
 6. Id. at 2531–32. 
 7. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). 
 8. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 9. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 10. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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A. “Indicia of Reliability” 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the defendant was charged with forgery of a 
check and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to his wife.11 
At the preliminary hearing, the defendant’s daughter was called to 
testify.12 The defense attempted to elicit testimony from the 
daughter corroborating the defendant’s version of events, but failed 
to do so.13 As a result, the case proceeded to trial.14 
Rather than calling the daughter at trial, the state offered the 
transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony.15 The defense 
objected and argued that her absence, and the fact that the 
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine her testimony at 
trial, was a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.16 
Before the trial, the state had attempted to serve the defendant’s 
daughter with multiple subpoenas left at her parents’ residence, but 
it was not clear if she received them.17 By that time she had already 
left the state and lost contact with her parents.18 At trial, the 
prosecution made no attempt to locate the daughter, nor did they 
show the court that the daughter “would be absent because of 
unavailability.”19  
The Court in Roberts affirmed the state court’s holding that 
when a hearsay declarant is not available for cross-examination at 
trial, the statement can bypass the Confrontation Clause if it “bears 
adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”20 The Court further stated that 
“[i]n other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”21 This 
standard lasted for more than twenty years until the Court 
reexamined the issue in Crawford v. Washington. 
 
 11. 448 U.S. 56, 58 (1980). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 59. 
 15.  Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18.  Id. at 59–60. 
 19. Id. at 60. 
 20. Id. at 66. 
 21. Id. 
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B. The Confrontation Clause 
The Court laid out the framework for applying the 
Confrontation Clause in several recent watershed cases, including 
Crawford. The Confrontation Clause is contained in the Sixth 
Amendment and requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”22 In 2004, for example, the Court decided Crawford v. 
Washington and further produced guidelines concerning the 
admission of previously admitted hearsay statements. Crawford 
reversed the rationale set forth in Roberts and held that reliability 
does not adequately replace the opportunity for cross-examination 
required by the Sixth Amendment.  
1. Crawford v. Washington 
In Crawford, the defendant was charged with assault and 
attempted murder as a result of stabbing another man whom he 
believed had attempted to rape his wife.23 The defendant’s wife was 
present when the defendant stabbed the victim.24 After arresting the 
defendant, the police spoke with the defendant’s wife and obtained a 
statement from her regarding the events.25 At trial, the State used 
this recorded statement rather than live testimony against the 
defendant because the wife invoked the marital privilege.26 The state 
court determined that her statements were reliable enough to be 
used at trial and overcome any hearsay problems.27 The State 
subsequently convicted the defendant based upon the statements of 
the wife to the police.28 While the state court upheld the conviction, 
the Supreme Court reversed on appeal.29 
The petitioner in Crawford had urged the Court to reconsider 
the reasoning of Roberts,30 arguing that the Roberts test “stray[ed] 
from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”31 In 
 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 40. 
 27. Id. at 38. 
 28. Id. at 40–41. 
 29. Id. at 41. 
 30. Id. at 42. 
 31. Id. 
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coming to its determination, the Court spent a great deal of time 
explaining the history and development of the Confrontation Clause. 
Justice Scalia, a formalist, authored the opinion and explained that 
the Roberts test misinterpreted the original meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.32 The Court in Crawford held that the 
criminally accused have a right to confront and cross-examine 
recorded statements of witnesses given to the police, regardless of 
the court’s opinion about the testimony’s reliability.33 For 
testimonial statements, “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”34 
2. Davis v. Washington  
The Davis Court further defined the characteristics of 
“testimony” for Confrontation Clause purposes. Under Crawford, 
statements of a testimonial nature cannot be used in court unless a 
party has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In Davis, 
the Court further delineated what constitutes a testimonial statement 
and held that statements testimonial in nature or intent require 
cross-examination to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.35 In Davis, 
the statements at issue involved comments made during the 
recording of a telephone call made to 911.36 At the time of the 911 
call, the caller had just been attacked and identified her boyfriend as 
the assailant.37 The boyfriend was subsequently found and charged 
with a felony violation of a domestic no-contact order in place at the 
time.38 Although the victim was apparently available to testify, the 
court admitted the recording of her 911 call over the defendant’s 
objection.39 The Washington State Supreme Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court both upheld the conviction.40 
The Court reasoned that to determine whether a statement 
deserves Confrontation Clause protection, courts must first 
 
 32.  Id. at 60. 
 33.  Id. at 68–69. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006).  
 36. Id. at 817–18.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 818.  
 39.  Id. at 819.  
 40.  Id. 
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determine whether the statement is “testimonial.”41 The Court had 
previously set forth “various formulations” in Crawford, but declined 
to endorse any of them in Davis.42 Instead, the Davis Court 
attempted to provide a non-exhaustive description of testimonial 
versus non-testimonial statements43: “Statements are nontestimonial 
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”44 The 
Court concluded that statements in 911 calls were testimonial “when 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”45 Thus, in Davis, the Court held that the statements 
made to the 911 operator in this portion of the call were not 
testimonial in nature, but rather were made pursuant to an ongoing 
emergency.46 Accordingly, the statements did not require the type of 
Confrontation Clause protections afforded testimonial statements. 
III. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS 
The reasoning of Crawford and Davis proved critical in 
Melendez-Diaz. Melendez-Diaz appeared before the Court in 2009, 
five years after Crawford and three years after Davis. The Melendez-
Diaz Court held that forensic affidavits are testimonial in nature and 
require Confrontation Clause protections for an accused.47 
 
 41. See id. at 821–22. 
 42. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
 43. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (explaining that the Court did not even want to 
“attempt[] to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements—or even all 
conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—as either testimonial or non-
testimonial”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 828 (“This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation 
to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme Court put it, 
‘evolve into testimonial statements,’ 829 N.E.2d, at 457, once that purpose has been 
achieved.”).  Both the Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court agreed that 
although some of the statements made during the latter portion of the 911 call might have 
been testimonial in nature, in this case “their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Id. at 829. 
 47. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531–32 (2009). 
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A. Facts 
In 2001, Boston police received a tip that a Kmart employee, 
Thomas Wright, was “engage[d] in suspicious activity” while at 
work.48 The suspicious employee would take breaks and leave for the 
parking lot shortly after receiving phone calls at work.49 Outside, a 
blue sedan would meet Wright briefly, after which Wright would 
return to work.50 Police subsequently surveilled the parking lot and 
observed the suspicious behavior.51 As Wright exited the car, an 
officer detained and searched him.52 The officer found four clear 
plastic baggies “containing a substance resembling cocaine.”53 As a 
result, the officer signaled for the assisting officers to arrest the other 
two occupants of the vehicle, one of whom was the defendant 
Melendez-Diaz.54 
All three suspects were placed in the back of the same police 
car.55 During the drive to the station, the passengers fidgeted and 
moved around in the back of the car.56 The police searched the 
vehicle after dropping the suspects off at the station and found 
nineteen other small plastic baggies containing a substance similar to 
that contained in the four baggies initially discovered by the police.57 
As a result, prosecutors charged Melendez-Diaz with distributing 
cocaine and trafficking cocaine “in an amount between 14 and 28 
grams.”58 When the prosecution entered the baggies into evidence, 
“[i]t also submitted three ‘certificates of analysis.’”59 These 
certificates contained the laboratory results concerning the weight 
and identity of the substance contained in the baggies.60 Pursuant to 
Massachusetts state law, the analysts at the state forensic laboratory 
signed the certificates and had them notarized.61 
 
 48. Id. at 2530. 
 49.  Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2530–31. 
 60. Id. at 2531. 
 61. Id. 
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At trial, Melendez-Diaz argued that the admission of the 
certificates violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause as set 
forth in Crawford.62 Melendez-Diaz argued that the Confrontation 
Clause “required the analysts to testify in person.”63 The trial court 
overruled the objection and stated that the certificates were “prima 
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the 
narcotic . . . analyzed” pursuant to state law.64  
B. Procedural History 
The jury subsequently convicted Melendez-Diaz. On appeal, 
Melendez-Diaz raised multiple issues, among them, “that admission 
of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”65 Relying on 
Massachusetts state law and case history, the court rejected this 
claim.66 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals believed that “authors 
of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment.”67 The state Supreme Judicial Court 
denied review.68 
C. Holding 
In a 5-4 split, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts 
erred in permitting the prosecution to use out-of-court certificates to 
prove its case without providing the defendant an opportunity to 
cross-examine the lab technicians.69 The Court stated that resolving 
this case “involve[d] little more than the application of our holding 
in Crawford.”70 
These certificates fell within the class of testimonial statements 
covered by the Confrontation Clause.71 The state created the 
certificates “for the sole purpose of providing evidence against a 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2003)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 2542. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 2532. 
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defendant.”72 Thus, the affidavits qualified as a “witness” and 
“testimony” against Melendez-Diaz for Confrontation Clause 
purposes, and Melendez-Diaz therefore had a constitutional right to 
confront the witness through cross-examination.73 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court Was Correct in Extending Crawford to Lab Analysts 
The majority correctly and persuasively argued against the 
positions adhered to by the respondents and the dissent. In striking 
down these counterarguments, the majority clearly explained that 
certificates and affidavits are testimonial in nature; they do not differ 
from “conventional” witnesses; they do not fit under any current 
hearsay exceptions; and that the dissent over-exaggerated the 
potential burden on the system. 
1. Certificates are testimonial and accusatory 
One of the first issues the Court addressed concerned whether 
certificates, or affidavits, qualify as testimonial statements. The Court 
correctly held that affidavits, or certificates, “fall within the ‘core 
class of testimonial statements’” that are covered by the 
Confrontation Clause.74  
Lab technicians prepare these affidavits for use at trial against the 
defendant. Under the reasoning of Crawford, the defendant must 
have an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst regarding the 
affidavit. More directly, the affidavits serve an evidentiary purpose 
and are not part of an ongoing emergency like the identification 
made in Davis. The Melendez-Diaz Court even pointed to the actual 
affidavit itself and the Massachusetts state law provision, which stated 
that “the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie 
evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the 
analyzed substance.”75 Technicians sign and swear that the 
information contained in lab reports is accurate. The very nature of 
this act signifies that the technician is testifying that the information 
 
 72. Id. at 2539. 
 73. Id. at 2532. 
 74. Id. (referring to White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)). 
 75. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2003)). 
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contained in the certificates is true, making the affidavit testimonial 
just like any other conventional testimony. 
Although the respondent argued that—unlike conventional 
testimony—the forensic evidence is objective and not accusatory, the 
Court emphasized that statements do not have to be accusatory to 
qualify as testimony subject to the Confrontation Clause.76 
Conventional witnesses, for example, often testify concerning non-
accusatory information such as a description of a crime scene, their 
personal observations, and other details of a crime. A lab technician’s 
statements regarding evidence found at a crime scene are no different 
than statements provided by a “conventional” witness. 
 
2. Scientific report certificates are not neutral and can be prone to 
distortion or manipulation 
 
The Court correctly reasoned that laboratory report certificates 
are testimonial in nature and thus require that the accused have an 
opportunity to cross-examine those who prepare them. The dissent 
and the respondent incorrectly argued that these affidavits are not 
like conventional witness testimony and thus should not be subject 
to the Confrontation Clause because the evidence they are based on 
is not “prone to [the same] distortion or manipulation” as is possible 
when “recounting historical events.”77 The Court correctly dismissed 
this reasoning since it was the same logic that had been overturned 
in Roberts. The “trustworthiness” of the testimony is no longer a 
factor in determining whether testimony should be subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.78 The respondent and the dissent both gave 
forensic evidence too much credit. Respondents incorrectly argued 
that scientific reports are not like conventional testimony because 
they are “neutral” and not subject to the same errors as conventional 
live witnesses.79 
The dissent claimed that confrontation of these analysts by a 
defendant “adds nothing.”80 Beyond the simple fact that allowing 
confrontation is a constitutional mandate, failure to allow 
confrontation could legitimize the mistaken belief some jurors hold 
 
 76. Id. at 2533. 
 77. Id. at 2536. 
 78. See id. at 2532–33, 2536. 
 79. Id. at 2536. 
 80. Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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that all forensic evidence is equally infallible. Arguments such as this 
perpetuate the myth that some in the media refer to as the “CSI 
effect.”81 Instead, the majority recognized that forensic evidence is 
not as objective as the respondent and dissent made it sound.82 
Forensic evidence can easily be corrupted or manipulated by lab 
technicians who are in a rush or who are trying to make the evidence 
fit the suspect.83  
The constitutional principle of confrontation provides a 
defendant with an opportunity to mitigate the possible effects of 
technicians making mistakes, using improper techniques, or holding 
biases. Cross-examination allows a defendant to question a 
technician and ensure that the evidence against him has been tested 
as accurately as possible. This is not meant to imply that lab 
technicians generally are corrupt or make mistakes, but it only takes 
one lab technician with ulterior motives to produce a report leading 
to the wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant.84 Cross-
examination provides an opportunity to expose some of these 
potential problems. 
Additionally, public perception seems to view forensic evidence 
and science as one and the same. As discussed further in Part IV, 
many of these forensic techniques are not as reliable as conventional 
scientific evidence (such as DNA evidence) and have not been 
equally subjected to the rigors of the scientific process. Given the 
errors that can occur during the gathering or testing of forensic 
evidence, the Court correctly extended the reasoning of Crawford to 
cover forensic evidence and lab technicians’ affidavits.  
3. Confrontation extends beyond “conventional” witnesses 
The dissent and the respondent incorrectly argued that the 
Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against the type of 
testimony “notoriously used at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh” and 
not lab technicians.85 Although affidavits and lab technicians are not 
“conventional” witnesses, the majority best explained the 
 
 81. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 82. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. 
 83. See infra Part V. 
 84. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 44 (2009), 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12589 [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
 85. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/12/2010  5:49:10 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1036 
immateriality of this distinction: “[The Raleigh] case identifies the 
core of the right to confrontation, not its limits. The right to 
confrontation was not invented in response to the use of the ex parte 
examinations in Raleigh’s Case.”86 Permitting the presentation of 
forensic evidence against a defendant without an opportunity to 
cross-examine the technician who prepared the report can lead to 
wrongful convictions and modern day Raleighs. The dissent listed 
three ways that conventional witnesses differ from lab affidavits; 
however, none of these three reasons should exempt affidavits from 
cross-examination. 
 
a. Analysts were not “near-contemporaneous.” In an apparent 
attempt to resurrect the Roberts standard, the dissent argued that 
contemporary witnesses are less trustworthy because they tend to be 
further removed from the events than lab technicians. Conventional 
witnesses “may have misperceived or misremembered,”87 whereas a 
lab technician makes “a contemporaneous observation [and] need 
not rely on memory; he or she instead reports the observations at the 
time they are made.”88 Using reliability as a reason to exempt 
testimony from cross-examination was rejected, however, by the 
Court in Crawford.89  
Even if a court did factor reliability into the determination, a lab 
analyst does not always prepare the affidavits immediately after 
performing the test. In Melendez-Diaz, for instance, the analysts 
prepared the affidavits a week after they performed the tests. The 
dissent failed to explain what limits differentiate “near-
contemporaneous” from events too far in the past. Regardless of 
where one attempts to draw a line, reliability as to the memory of 
events should not come into play when determining whether it 
requires cross-examination. 
Analysts make mistakes and may use controversial methods to 
obtain results. Simply because the analyst makes the affidavit shortly 
after using improper methods does not mean she is more reliable 
than a conventional witness. The core right to confrontation allows 
for the accused to cross-examine testimony against him. The accused 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy was the only Justice who switched from the majority 
in Crawford to the dissent in Melendez-Diaz.  
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has a right to question a witness regarding bias and any other reasons 
the lab results might be tainted. And while confrontation is not the 
only way to challenge the results of a forensic test, it is one way 
specifically provided by the Constitution. 
The Court stated that “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring 
accurate forensic analysis.”90 An honest analyst has nothing to fear in 
court and will likely testify truthfully regarding her methods and 
results because she has nothing to hide. However, a dishonest analyst 
may reconsider her fraudulent analysis. Requiring lab technicians to 
testify may reduce the number of fraudulent cases. An analyst who 
knows she will be confronted with the results and be prosecuted for 
perjury may likely think twice before fabricating results. 
Moreover, confrontation can protect against fraudulent as well as 
incompetent analysis. Requiring an analyst to testify and qualify as an 
expert witness can help “weed out” some of the improper forensic 
evidence.91 One study showed that invalid forensic testimony 
contributed to wrongful criminal convictions in as many as 60 
percent of the cases.92 The Court also quoted Professor Pamela 
Metzger who stated that the “legal community now concedes, with 
varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces erroneous 
convictions based on discredited forensics.”93  
Consensus within the legal field and among the public continues 
to be elusive, but many recognize that all forensic evidence is not 
created equal. Subjectivity and bias can come into play. In light of 
these considerations, and as the Court recognized, it is not sound to 
base decisions about the right to confront analysts on the basis that 
their statements may be made in closer temporal proximity to the 
actual observation than those of ordinary witnesses. 
 
b. Analysts “observe neither the crime nor any human action 
related to it.” The dissent argued an analyst differs from a 
conventional witness because “[o]ften, the analyst does not know 
the defendant’s identity” nor does she have any knowledge of the 
 
 90. Id. at 2536 (majority opinion). 
 91. See id. at 2537. 
 92. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009). 
 93. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the 
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 491 (2006)). 
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defendant’s guilt.94 However, because of the subjectivity involved in 
some of the forensic techniques, analysts may suppress or manipulate 
evidence to alleviate the pressures put on them by investigative 
detectives.95 A British researcher, for example, has performed studies 
showing that “fingerprint examiners can be influenced by what else 
they know about a case.”96 Some of his experiments even resulted in 
“the same examiner . . . com[ing] to different conclusions about the 
same fingerprint, if the context is changed over time.”97 Evidence 
susceptible to this degree of subjectivity should be subject to cross-
examination by the accused. 
Moreover, the dissent did not adequately expound upon this 
concept of analysts being adequately removed in time. Simply 
because a witness at trial did not observe the crime, for instance, 
does not make him an unconventional witness. Expert witnesses have 
long been used at trial, and the Court has never exempted expert 
witnesses from Confrontation Clause requirements merely because 
they did not “observe . . . the crime nor any human action related to 
it.”98 This should not, therefore, be a reason to exempt lab analysts. 
 
c. Conventional witnesses respond to interrogation. Lastly, Justice 
Kennedy apparently assumed that lab affidavits are objective and 
non-adversarial. Justice Kennedy offered the distinction that unlike 
lab technicians, the Constitution only requires that an accused be 
permitted to confront conventional witnesses and their out-of-court 
statements that are adversarial to the accused.99 This argument 
ignored the subjectivity that comes with some forensic analysis 
techniques.100  
Throughout his dissent, Justice Kennedy appears to have based 
his analysis on the faulty assumption that all forensic evidence has 
passed the rigors of scientific analysis and is therefore not subject to 
significant error. But the inherent nature of some forensic analysis 
requires the analyst to draw her own conclusions rather than merely 
 
 94. Id. at 2553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 95. See NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 44–48. 
 96. Henry Fountain, Plugging Holes in the Science of Forensics, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 
2009, at D1. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See infra Part V. 
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printing out the results of a chemical analysis done by a computer. 
Faulty forensic evidence has contributed to too many wrongful 
convictions to assume that it is scientific, objective, and non-
adversarial.101 
Forensic evidence may be volunteered, but volunteered 
statements can be deemed testimonial—as those provided to the 
police in Davis were.102 Although police may have questioned the 
witness, the accused still has a right to confront anyone making an 
accusation against him in court, regardless of whether the witness’s 
statements came voluntarily or under subpoena. The Court stated 
that these prior statements concerned “establishing the facts of a past 
crime” and clearly required confrontation protection.103 Lab analysts 
perform tests in order to establish facts of past crimes as well, and the 
accused should receive the same confrontational opportunities for 
this type of evidence. 
4. Lab affidavits do not fit under the business, official, or public records 
exception 
The dissent attempted to compare lab result affidavits to other 
types of documents that fit under the business or public records 
hearsay exceptions. However, this line of reasoning fails when one 
considers that those exceptions are meant to allow the introduction 
of documents that were primarily prepared for non-court use. Lab 
technicians prepare affidavits for the primary purpose of use as 
testimony against a defendant at trial. Allowing affidavits to come in 
under one of these exceptions again takes a detour around the 
constitutional right of confrontation. 
The dissent incorrectly argued that the Framers did not intend to 
require confrontation for these unconventional witnesses. Although 
lab analysts did not exist at the time, the dissent stated that forensic 
lab analysts are comparable to copyists.104 The Court has long 
allowed parties to introduce into evidence copies of official 
documents without requiring the copyist to testify. However, in 
comparison to copyists who only make manual facsimiles of their 
product, the work of a lab analyst introduces far more subjectivity. In 
 
 101. See supra note 4. 
 102. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006). 
 103. Id. 
 104.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2552–53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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other words, forensic evidence analysis requires analysts to make 
logical educated guesses. 
As this Note further discusses in Part IV, forensic analysis 
requires much more subjective input than many would at first 
imagine. Much like many juries, the dissent appears to have fallen 
victim to the “CSI effect.”105 
5. Subpoena analyst under Compulsory Process Clause or state statute 
The Compulsory Process Clause and Confrontation Clause serve 
two different purposes in dictating which witnesses a defendant may 
call. The Confrontation Clause provides a defendant with the 
opportunity to confront witnesses “against” him.106 Conversely, the 
Compulsory Process Clause permits a defendant to call witnesses “in 
his favor.”107 The majority opinion clearly stated that all witnesses fit 
within one of these two categories. The majority rejected the 
attempt by the dissent to carve out a third category of witnesses 
helpful to the prosecution, but not qualifying as witnesses “against” 
the accused.108 The dissent stated that defendants can already 
subpoena analysts to testify under the Compulsory Process Clause. 
The majority rejected this argument by stating that it “is no 
substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the Confrontation 
Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the 
witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear.”109 
6. Burden on the system 
a. Burden is no reason to ignore a defendant’s constitutional 
protection. The Constitution is not an efficiency guide that values 
efficiency over the rights of individuals. Although some situations 
may call for a suspension of some constitutional rights—such as a 
suspension of habeas corpus, searches without a warrant, or 
restrictions on free speech—the burden of making a lab technician 
appear in court does not justify denying a criminal defendant the 
constitutional right to confront the technician’s testimony against 
him.  
 
 105. See supra note 2. 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533–34. 
 109. Id. at 2540. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/12/2010  5:49:10 PM 
1025 No Longer the Right to Remain Silent 
 1041 
 
b. Majority doubts implications expressed by respondent and dissent. 
Although the dissent laid out dire warnings concerning the 
floodgates Melendez-Diaz may open, some states have already 
instituted similar confrontation requirements without crippling their 
justice systems. Specifically, nine states have required technicians to 
testify as a result of Crawford.110 Mississippi began requiring lab 
technicians to testify in order to avoid Confrontation Clause 
violations in 1985 as a result of a Mississippi Supreme Court 
decision.111 The court stated that “allow[ing], without the consent of 
the defendant, this essential element to be proven solely by a 
certificate of the analyst impermissibly lessens the constitutionally 
required burden which is on the state.”112 
The Melendez-Diaz dissent believed that although some states 
have provided the accused with a right to confrontation, the full 
effects of this practice have not yet fully affected the system. “These 
States have not yet been subject to the widespread, adverse results of 
the formalism the Court mandates today.”113 Justice Kennedy did 
not explain the portents that apparently provided this long term 
foreseeability. 
In response to the argument that the Melendez-Diaz requirement 
would overwhelm judicial systems, subsequent observers have 
detailed that some states already require testimony by lab 
technicians.114 In describing these states, the petitioner in Briscoe v. 
Virginia stated that states requiring lab technician testimony have 
“shoulder[ed] their burden . . . . [T]hese jurisdictions still have 
functioning criminal justice systems: drug cases are prosecuted, guilty 
pleas are entered, and trials at which forensic analysts testify in 
person for the prosecution are had.”115 
If courts continue to permit unconventional evidence in criminal 
cases, the Court should not permit this unconventional testimony to 
skirt the rights guaranteed in the Constitution merely because it will 
 
 110. See id. at 2541 n.11. 
 111. See Barnette v. State, 481 So. 2d 788 (Miss. 1985). 
 112. Id. at 791. 
 113. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2558 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 114. See infra Part V.D. 
 115. Brief for Pub. Defender Serv. for D.C. and the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2009) (No. 07-
11191). 
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cost the state more to support its evidence. The dissent believed the 
costs imposed by requiring technicians to testify would lead to the 
guilty going free and an abuse of “Melendez-Diaz objections” by 
zealous defense attorneys. However, nothing comes free. These same 
objections could be raised against other types of constitutional 
protections, such as jury trials. As long as courts allow analysts to 
present subjective forensic evidence testimony, the Court should 
continue to allow a defendant to cross-examine the preparer of the 
testimony. 
 
c. Resolving which laboratory technician testifies. The dissent 
provided numerous scenarios involving multiple analysts involved in 
one forensic test and considered which analyst should testify.116 
These are legitimate concerns that the Court should address and for 
which it should provide guidelines. However, the fact that such 
issues remain unclear should not prevent application of the principle. 
State courts have operated in this void by imposing different 
rules concerning which analyst must testify to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment. California courts, for example, have generally held that 
testimony by a technician other than the one who prepared the 
report violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.117 On the 
other hand, Mississippi does not require the technician who 
performed the tests to testify, but does require someone from the lab 
to do so.118 The Court did not address this in Melendez-Diaz and 
again missed the opportunity to provide a procedure for analyst 
testimony in Briscoe v. Virginia.119 
The dissent also mentioned chain of custody and authentication 
problems involved with requiring analyst testimony. The 
authentication argument contends that it would require the copyist 
 
 116. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544–45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 117. See, e.g., People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (Sixth 
Amendment violation where a pathologist testified in reliance on an autopsy report that he 
himself did not create); People v. Carruth, 2009 WL 2564832 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2009) 
(unpublished) (Sixth Amendment violation where a forensic toxicologist testified about 
another forensic toxicologist’s curriculum vitae and about the nature of the lab report the 
other toxicologist generated); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009) (no Sixth Amendment violation where the director of the lab testified based on 
toxicology reports prepared by other analysts). 
 118. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2558 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Kennedy believes 
that Mississippi’s practice possibly may not reconcile with the Melendez-Diaz holding. 
 119. See infra Part V.D. 
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to testify. Again the dissent improperly compared a copyist to an 
analyst. Authentication should not be an issue when one realizes the 
differences between an analyst who produces a document containing 
subjective findings for court and someone making a facsimile of the 
report. 
The dissent also argued that the decision by the majority could 
be extended to require each person in the chain of custody to testify, 
which has never been the case for police officers. Although it remains 
unclear which technician should testify when multiple technicians 
take part in the testing, a reductio ad absurdum argument should not 
refute an argument yet to be fully defined.  
The decision in Melendez-Diaz may create some additional 
burdens on laboratory technicians, but it ensures that the 
government meets its constitutionally required burden. Inefficiency 
should not excuse the State from providing defendants with the 
opportunity to confront witnesses against them. The infamous trial 
of Sir Walter Raleigh influenced many jurisdictions throughout the 
world. The justice system must avoid denying defendants the right to 
confront the witnesses against them in the same manner in which the 
Crown denied the right to Sir Walter Raleigh.  
V. THE NEW WITNESS: FORENSIC SCIENCE 
The Melendez-Diaz majority also correctly relied on the findings 
of the National Academy of Sciences’ (“NAS”) Report throughout 
its opinion. The findings of the committee revealed a system in need 
of overhaul. In order to combat forensic mistakes, the Court 
reasoned that “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate 
forensic analysis.”120 
Forensic evidence can easily turn a trial against or in favor of a 
defendant. Presenting forensic reports alone without an expert can 
incorrectly lead a layperson on the jury to assume its truthfulness. 
The NAS Report stated that “[t]he fact is that many forensic 
tests . . . have never been exposed to stringent scientific scrutiny.”121 
This does not mean forensic evidence should be prohibited, nor does 
it imply that forensic evidence is inherently faulty. Instead, this fact 
merely highlights that the Court’s decision to require a laboratory 
technician to testify is justified considering the possibility of faulty 
 
 120. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. 
 121. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 42. 
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evidence. Some techniques used to evaluate forensic evidence have 
not been as thoroughly tested as others—a fact that can lead to bias, 
faulty evidence, and wrongful convictions.122 
A. National Academy of Sciences Report 
In November 2005, Congress authorized “the National 
Academy of Sciences [“NAS”] to conduct a study on forensic 
science, as described in the Senate report.”123 The Senate Report 
instructed the committee to research and report on several areas of 
forensic science.124 In the fall of 2006, the NAS established a 
committee composed of “members of the forensic science 
community, members of the legal community, and a diverse group 
of scientists.”125 
The Senate did not ask the Academy to investigate DNA 
evidence because DNA has already passed scientific scrutiny and 
analysis.126 Other forms of forensic evidence, however, have not 
undergone the same rigorous scientific scrutiny as DNA,127 even 
though they can have a similar impact in a criminal trial. Thus, the 
report focused on non-DNA forensic evidence and the crime 
laboratories performing the analysis. 
The report revealed that crime laboratories and the methods 
used for forensic evidence have “serious problems.”128 The 
consistency of the testimony and evidence presented to the members 
of the committee “surprised” them.129 To address these problems, 
the committee has called for a new federal entity to deal with the 
problems highlighted in the report and institute the 
recommendations made therein.130  
The proposed “National Institute of Forensic Science” would 
address many of the problem areas that existing federal agencies are 
not adequately equipped to handle.131 The report calls for the new 
 
 122. See id. at 4, 37. 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 109-272, at 121 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). 
 124. See S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005). 
 125. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 2. 
 126. See S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005). 
 127. See NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 8. 
 128. Id. at xx. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 18–19. 
 131. Id.  
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entity to be rooted in science and to develop strong ties to forensic 
labs and organizations throughout the country.132 The agency would 
be separate from any law enforcement agencies and would be willing 
to push for improvements.133 
The report received a mixed response from the forensic 
community, but some welcomed the critique. Lawrence Kobilinsky, 
chairman of the department of sciences at John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice in New York, stated that “the report was ‘basically 
saying what many of us have been saying for a long time . . . [that] 
[t]here are a lot of areas in forensics that need improvement.’”134 
Elaine Pagliaro, a Connecticut State Police analyst, called the recent 
scrutiny “good.”135 “‘It’s important for the public to have a realistic 
expectation of what the science can do.’”136  
B. Problems with Forensic Science 
The Report refers to the field of forensic evidence as a 
“fragmented system”137 with “serious problems”138 and 
“deficiencies.”139 The committee made thirteen recommendations 
for improvement.140 The committee argued that although Congress 
and a new National Institute will not likely fix all deficiencies within 
the current system, “truly meaningful advances will not come 
without significant concomitant leadership from the federal 
government.”141 
Although forensic evidence has been used to identify the guilty, 
it has also led to the conviction of the innocent.142 Some of these 
wrongful convictions resulted from forensic methods that have 
developed outside the rigors of the scientific method. The report 
states that “[a]lthough research has been done in some disciplines, 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Fountain, supra note 96. 
 135. Reagan, supra note 1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 14. 
 138. Id. at xx. 
 139. Id. at 18. 
 140. See id. at 19–33. 
 141. Id. at 16. 
 142. Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate 
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007). 
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there is a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies 
establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic 
methods.”143 
Forensic science embodies a range of analytical disciplines that 
exhibit “wide variability . . . with regard to techniques, 
methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors, 
research, general acceptability, and published material.”144 
Unfortunately, “no forensic method other than nuclear DNA 
analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently and with a high degree of certainty” match a sample to a 
source.145 Despite these problems, Justice Kennedy began his dissent 
by stating that “[t]he Court sweeps away an accepted rule governing 
the admission of scientific evidence.”146 However, Justice Kennedy 
ignored the subjectivity of some forms of forensic evidence and failed 
to recognize that it is not all infallible and equal.  
1. Subjective, expert-based evidence: fingerprints, ballistics, 
screwdrivers, and more 
Forensic evidence consists of laboratory based evidence and 
evidence based on “expert interpretation of observed patterns.”147 
Lab based evidence such as toxicology, DNA, and drug analysis, 
comes as a result of processes that have undergone the rigors of the 
scientific process. The NAS noticed a “sharp distinction[]” between 
chemists, biochemists, medical doctors, and the other forensic 
“technicians who lend support to forensic science enterprises.”148 
Forensic evidence based on expert interpretation and observed 
patterns provides analysts with much more subjectivity and an 
increased possibility of error and bias.  
Forensic evidence comes in many shapes and forms—from 
fingerprint and bite mark analysis, to ballistic patterns on spent shell 
casings. Although DNA is the most accurate and objective of 
forensic evidence,149 it only makes up ten percent of laboratory case 
 
 143. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 8.  
 144. Id. at 6–7. 
 145. Id. at 87. 
 146. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 147. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 7. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
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work150 and can still find itself subject to error and mistakes.151 The 
remaining forensic evidence used against defendants tends to consist 
of other more subjective evidence interpreted by analysts.152 
Fingerprint evidence has led to some embarrassing public 
misidentifications. One of the most famous of these came during the 
investigation into the Madrid, Spain train bombings in 2004.153 A 
fingerprint found on a plastic bag at the scene implicated an Oregon 
lawyer named Brandon Mayfield. His fingerprint was in the FBI 
database due to his prior military service. This fingerprint match led 
to Mayfield’s arrest and the FBI’s subsequent embarrassment due to 
the impossibility of Mayfield’s involvement.154 
Fingerprint identification has recently come under fire from legal 
experts.155 Juries sometimes do not understand the impreciseness of 
fingerprinting technology because “fingerprint examiners typically 
testify in the language of absolute certainty.”156 However, “certain 
confidence in identification [is] unjustified.”157 One scholar believes 
that in order to pass legal scrutiny as an expert witness, “fingerprint 
identification experts should exhibit a greater degree of 
epistemological humility.”158 In one study, when six fingerprint 
examiners studied the same print twice, only two of the six reached 
the same conclusion both times.159 
Some forensic science methods allow human error to easily enter 
into play. Human bias can lead to a technician trying to make the 
evidence fit his or her preconceived suspects rather than letting the 
evidence lead to the proper suspect. In an investigation resulting 
from the Mayfield case, for example, a panel of experts found that 
the involved “culture discouraged fingerprint examiners from 
disagreeing with their superiors” and was prone to insufficient 
 
 150. Id. at 41. 
 151. See, e.g., id. at 132. 
 152. See id. at 7, 38. 
 153. David Stout, Report Faults F.B.I.’s Fingerprint Scrutiny in Arrest of Lawyer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A18. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Reagan, supra note 1. 
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scrutiny.160 Although bias on the part of investigators may be well-
intentioned, it may also lead to incorrect results. For example, 
researchers have noted that bias on the part of an investigator 
involved with suspect identification can lead to faulty identifications 
on the part of witnesses.161 Bias and error can also creep into other 
areas of forensic evidence.  
Other methods often seen on CSI: Miami and viewed as 
authoritative by the public—such as ballistic identification, dental 
marks, and arson forensics—face the same limitations as fingerprints. 
As technology evolves, so do the data and evidence investigators can 
gather and use against defendants. Some are even trying, for 
example, to determine how to identify a screwdriver used in prying 
open a door or window.162 While the proponents of such evidence 
have excellent intentions and crave accuracy, these methods have 
often not been subjected to the rigors of the scientific process. Even 
when they have been, they often nevertheless lack the accuracy of 
DNA, or even that of fingerprints. When such evidence is used in 
court, the accused must always have an opportunity to cross-examine 
the analyst submitting it in order to help jurors realize the limits of 
such evidence. 
2. Wrongful convictions 
Wrongful convictions will continue to exist despite radical 
improvements regarding forensic science. After all, not all 
convictions are based on forensic evidence. Forensic evidence has 
been responsible for the exculpation of convicts as well as the 
conviction of the innocent.163 
Blackstone said, “Better that ten guilty persons escape than that 
one innocent suffer.”164 “But why ten”165 asked Professor Volokh, in 
examining the number posited by various courts and legal jurists 
throughout the centuries. Regardless of the number of guilty that 
must go free in order to protect the innocent, society has a moral 
 
 160. Stout, supra note 153.  
 161. The Innocence Project, Eyewitness Misidentification, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Sept. 
29, 2010) (calling eyewitness misidentification the “greatest cause of wrongful convictions”). 
 162. Fountain, supra note 96. 
 163. See supra note 4. 
 164. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. 
 165. See Alexander Volokh, Aside, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1997). 
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responsibility to make sure it does everything within its power to 
make sure this number is as low as possible. The United States must 
do everything within its power to ensure that evidentiary standards 
provide the accused with an adequate opportunity to confront the 
evidence against him. Otherwise, more innocent will suffer than 
necessary. 
Many go to their graves professing their innocence, and the 
Innocence Project has helped free some convicts throughout the past 
few decades.166 With the rise in the number of people exonerated by 
DNA, one must wonder how many convicts are still wrongfully 
imprisoned. Although researchers debate the numbers of wrongfully 
convicted by forensic evidence,167 a few recent news events have 
brought the issue to the public eye. 
Popular Mechanics and others in the media are starting to 
publicize the limits of forensic science and the human cost of it. In a 
recent issue of its magazine, Popular Mechanics profiled the 
conviction of Roy Brown.168 A New York jury convicted Brown 
based on bite marks found on the victim’s body that a forensic 
dentist identified as “entirely consistent” with Brown’s. Brown was 
later set free based on DNA evidence linking another suspect to the 
crime.169 Mistakes such as this are unfortunately common. 
In combination with the recently published NAS Report, a 
number of popular non-legal periodicals have started examining the 
reliability of forensic science and its role in death row cases.170 It 
appears that Texas recently executed a death row inmate who was 
actually innocent, yet condemned by faulty forensic evidence.171 
Although probably not the first wrongful execution, hopefully it will 
be the last as technology improves and as the accused receive more 
opportunities to cross-examine the evidence and its proponents 
against them. 
 
 166. The Innocence Project Fact Sheet: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,  
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php. 
 167. Supra note 4. 
 168. Reagan, supra note 1. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Did Texas Kill an Innocent Man?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/10/did_texas_kill_an_innoce
nt_man.cfm; Reagan, supra note 1. 
 171. See Did Texas Kill an Innocent Man?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/10/did_texas_kill_an_innoce
nt_man.cfm. 
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C. Solutions 
Going forward, both the Court and the forensic community 
must do its part to mitigate wrongful convictions and faulty science. 
The Court has done its part by requiring the prosecution to produce 
laboratory technicians and providing the defense with a right to 
confront these analysts. The scientific community must now 
implement the recommendations made by the NAS. In order to 
preserve the benefits that forensic evidence provides to investigators 
and mitigate the effects of faulty forensics, the NAS has 
recommended mandatory standardization, certification, and 
accreditation of laboratory analysts.172 Due to the broad range of 
forensic science disciplines, the NAS did not fully analyze each 
individual forensic area for its congressional report. 
Determining the accuracy of forensic evidence requires a national 
change of procedure. One problem facing the field is that the broad 
range of forensic techniques makes it difficult for the forensic 
community to set clear standards across the board. Forensic 
techniques also differ in terms of the protocols and research available 
in each particular area. However, these circumstances do not mean 
the forensic community cannot define minimum standards and 
protocols.  
In addition to minimum standards and protocols for each 
forensic discipline, the NAS identified a crucial need for courts and 
forensic analysts to identify the exact question the forensic evidence 
can address.173 For example, hair samples often cannot identify a 
specific individual, but it can likely identify specific traits.174 The NAS 
found that many forensic areas lacked established “limits and 
measures of performance” that would prevent incorrect inferences 
based on the evidence and technique.175 Identifying and establishing 
national standards, protocols, and limits of forensic evidence could 
lead to a reduction of faulty forensic evidence appearing in courts 
across the country. 
The establishment of a national board to oversee the standards 
used in expert-based evidence would provide another level of 
accountability beyond mere cross-examination. Requiring 
 
 172. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 6, 19. 
 173. Id. at 8. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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certification of forensic technicians could help limit the impact and 
employment of faulty and unreliable forensic techniques in litigation 
and criminal cases. By providing defendants with the right to cross-
examine technicians, hopefully jurors will realize that forensic 
evidence is not infallible. Permitting the prosecution to introduce 
forensic evidence affidavits without accompanying expert testimony 
undoubtedly reinforces the myth of the “CSI effect” in the minds of 
jurors.  
D. The Future of the Confrontation Clause after Melendez-Diaz 
Justice Sotomayor’s replacement of Justice Souter and the 
granting of certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia provided the Court with 
an opportunity to further outline requirements for forensic witnesses 
or even reconsider its decision in Melendez-Diaz. The majority in 
Melendez-Diaz consisted of Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter, Thomas, 
and Ginsburg. Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Kennedy, 
Breyer, and Alito made up the dissent. Accordingly, with Justice 
Sotomayor’s replacement of Justice Souter, her vote was almost 
certain to be the deciding vote in Briscoe.  
The Court announced the decision in Melendez-Diaz on June 
25, 2009. A few days later, on June 29, 2009, the Court granted 
certiorari to Briscoe,176 a case presenting a nearly identical issue to 
Melendez-Diaz.177 Although granting certiorari to Briscoe surprised 
some Court observers, some thought the Court wanted to hear 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion on the issue. 178 However, many others 
believed the Court would grant cert, vacate, and remand for further 
consideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.179 During Justice 
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing, Minnesota Senator and former 
prosecutor Amy Klobuchar expressed her disagreement with the 
outcome of Melendez-Diaz and asked Justice Sotomayor for her 
 
 176. See Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009). 
 177. Compare Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009) 
(“whether those affidavits are ‘testimonial,’ rendering the affiants ‘witnesses’ subject to the 
defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment”), with Briscoe, 129 S. Ct. 
2858 (asking the Court to determine whether the prosecution violates the Confrontation 
Clause by making laboratory technicians available to testify at the request of defense and 
presenting certificates without the testimony of the technicians).  
 178. See generally Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/new-lab-report-case-granted (June 29, 2009, 13:51 EST). 
 179. See, e.g., G . . . VR in Briscoe, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2010/01/ 
g-vr-in-briscoe.html (Jan. 25, 2010, 16:51 EST). 
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thoughts on the case.180 Justice Sotomayor did little to tip her hand 
about how she would have decided the case, but she did state that 
“it’s difficult proving cases as it is.”181 While noting that “calling 
more witnesses adds some burdens to the process,” Justice 
Sotomayor followed up by saying that “problems . . . can’t compel a 
result.”182  
Although the majority in Melendez-Diaz took on many of the 
counterarguments raised by the dissent, the Court left many 
procedural concerns unaddressed, including which technician 
testifies when multiple analysts are involved in an investigation, or 
how to mitigate possible floodgates opened by the decision. Rather 
than using Briscoe as an opportunity to address these issues or even 
cut back on the holding of Melendez-Diaz, however, the Court 
declined to do so. On January 25, 2010, the Court issued a per 
curium opinion vacating the Virginia Supreme Court ruling and 
remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with 
Melendez-Diaz.183 Why the Court initially granted certiorari remains 
unclear, but it is now evident that the Court reaffirmed Melendez-
Diaz as good law. The Court explained why forensic analysts must 
testify, but left the procedural details concerning how to the lower 
courts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A two-pronged effort by the courts and the forensic community 
to combat the introduction of faulty evidence will lead to more 
accurate forensic evidence and fewer wrongful convictions. This 
Note is not proposing suppression of forensic evidence, rather its 
intent is to highlight why the Melendez-Diaz Court correctly held 
that the Confrontation Clause requires laboratory technicians to 
testify in court.  
Justice Kennedy incorrectly stereotyped forensic evidence and 
the technicians who obtain the results as objective with little to no 
influence on the results. The NAS Report explains why this view is 
incorrect and suffers from the same “CSI effect” seen among the 
 
 180. See Sen. Klobuchar Questions Judge Sotomayor at Supreme Court Nomination 
Hearings, WASH. POST, July 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071501739.html. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per curiam). 
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general public. Should the Court have found that confrontation of 
lab analysts was not required by the Constitution, the “CSI effect” 
would have continued to deleteriously affect juries, and the idea that 
forensic evidence is infallible would have been legitimized. However, 
the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz appears to indicate that 
society is on the right track to exposing and avoiding the potential 
pitfalls when relying on forensic science. 
As forensic evidence analysis improves so will its accuracy. 
Lawrence Kobilinsky, chairman of the department of sciences at John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice, described forensic science best: “It’s 
not junk science. But that doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be 
improved.”184 The field of forensic science continues to improve its 
reliability and accuracy. As this happens, it is important that the 
accused have a chance to question the witnesses in court because it 
“is one means of assuring accurate forensic analysis.”185 
 Casey Unwin 
 
 184. Fountain, supra note 96. 
 185. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009). 
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